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EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PLAN INVALID
FOR LACK OF REASONABLE RELATION TO
SERVICES RENDERED
Berkwitz v. Humphrey,
163 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ohio 1958)
In a stockholder's derivative suit, plaintiff objected to the Manage-
ment Unit Plan, a profit sharing and pension plan adopted by the Pitts-
burgh Consolidation Coal Company for the benefit of its top level
executives. Under the plan, certain key employees were assigned a
designated number of units. Upon retirement at age sixty-five or upon
termination of employment at any time due to sickness or death, the
company agreed to pay the unit holders a sum equal to the increased
value of the units to which an employee was entitled measured by the
increased value, if any, of an equal number of shares of capital stock.
Thus an employee who participated in the plan for five years would be
given a bonus upon retirement equal to the number of units he held
multiplied by the rise in the market value of the capital stock during the
period in which he participated in the plan.
The federal district court for the northern district of Ohio held
that such a plan was unreasonable per se and invalid because the method
of computing the compensation bore no reasonable relation to services
rendered and was therefore a misuse of corporate funds.'
The court, having acknowledged the fact that it was dealing with
a singular case of first impression, began its examination of the plan by
stating the well settled principle that the "authorized compensation must
bear a reasonable relation to the value of the services of an employee."
2
The first objection to the plan raised by the court was that the market
value of the capital stock of a corporation is an unreliable index of the
value of services rendered by its key employees as it is governed by many
aleatory considerations.
This same problem was discussed in Gruber v. Chesapeake & 0.
Ry.3 where the court said:
I Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ohio 1958).
2 Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933); Gallin v. National City Bank, 273
N.Y.S. 87 (1934).
3 158 F. Supp. 593, 597 (N.D. Ohio 1957). The principal case and the Gruber
case were both decided by the federal district court for the northern district
of Ohio. The Gruber case was cited by the defendants in their motion to dismiss
but was not referred to in the opinion. It involved a stock option plan whereby
certain executives were given the opportunity to purchase company stock at
prices below market value. Such a plan bears a resemblance to the Management
Unit Plan in that whether the executive makes a profit above and beyond the
discount given him at time of purchase, depends upon the subsequent conduct of
the market value of the stock. The obvious difference is that the executive may
sell his stock at any time whereas the executive assigned units must wait until
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[I]t has become a business custom that corporation executives
are given a proprietary interest in the company for which they
work, through the granting of common stock at its present
market price. The executive's "benefit" materializes when the
stock which he has received rises in price on the market through
increased efficiency in management and operation of the
company.
The court in the Gruber case clearly indicated that there is some reason-
able relation between services rendered and the market value of the
stock, whereas the court in the principal case held that there is no
reasonable relationship between market value and services rendered.
The court held the plan unreasonable per se, thus ignoring the fact
that the retirement bonuses paid out from 1947 to 1952 amounted to
only 1.71 per cent of the dividends paid to stock holders.4 The court
employed the familiar device commonly known as "the parade of the
horribles" to show just what sort of incongruous results might be reached
by the use of such a plan. Again the court shut its eyes to the actual
results achieved by the plan during the first five years of operation.
In stockholders derivative suits such as this, the courts place the
burden of proof on the stockholder who challenges the plan and require
him to sustain it by showing that the excessive compensation stems from
fraud or bad faith practiced by the directors., Reasonableness of execu-
tive compensation is clearly a relative matter and lies in an area where
the courts have not required exact precision but have been satisfied with
rough approximation. In the principal case, plaintiff does not object to the
retirement bonuses as being "excessive" but only as being "unreasonable."
However, it is apparent that plaintiff's real objection is that, in the
future, the plan may result in excessive compensation for the participants,
thus cutting into plaintiff's right to the profits by way of dividends.
Generally, the courts have not considered compensation plans to be
excessive per se, but have compared the amounts with benefits paid by
other companies. 6 In Kalmanash v. Smith the court required the com-
retirement to realize any profit upon an increase in market value. Both plans
give the executive the incentive to work at his most productive level in order
to maximize profits and thus increase the value of the stock. However, once the
stock has been sold, the executive no longer has such an incentive. Such a result
is not possible with the Management Unit Plan, where the incentive is present
up to the day of retirement.
4 Brief for Defendant, p. 19, Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 F. Supp. 78 (N.D.
Ohio 1958). During the five year period from 1947 to 1952 the dividends paid
to stockholders amounted to $32,391,000.00. The retirement bonuses paid out to
employees amounted to $55,408.00.
5 Heinz v. National Bank of Commerce, 237 F. 942 (8th Cir. 1916); Gott-
fried v. Gottfried, 112 N.Y.S.2d 431 (1952) ; Kalmanash v. Smith, 291 N.Y.
142, 51 N.E.2d 681 (1943); CCH 1 PENSION PLAN RULINGS ff 10201 (1954); 5
FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 2126, 2129 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1952).
6 WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 371
(1951).
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plaint to state the amounts received by the executives and the services
performed as part of the factual showing of excessiveness.7 The court
relied heavily upon Rogers v. Hill s probably the most famous of all
stockholder litigation and the source of the principle that compensation
must be reasonably related to services. However, that case held that the
amount paid to the president of The American Tobacco Company was
unreasonable, not that the plan whereby the figure was computed was
unreasonable. In the Kalmanash case the court said that in a stock-
holder's derivative action, allegations that the corporation's payments to
certain officers thereof amounted to spoilation or waste of corporate funds
did not plead an actionable wrong in the absence of allegation of facts
showing bad faith or fraud practiced by the officers. Such a statement as
this is the result of the application of the "business judgment rule,"
whereby the courts defer to the honest judgment of the directors on
questions of corporate management and policy. 9
In the principal case there is a conspicuous absence of any proof of
excessiveness of amount of the bonuses or of fraud or bad faith on the
part of the directors. The plan had been in operation only a few years.
To say that in the future these retirement bonuses will be excessive is to
substitute the business judgment of the court for the 'business judgment
of the corporation. This is the very thing that the business judgment rule
was designed to prevent."0 When the soundness of a management de-
cision is questioned and the results of that decision are in futuro, the
business judgment rule requires that the court "render unto Caesar that
which is Caesar's." In a situation such as this, a holding that the decision
7 291 N.Y. 142, 51 N.E.2d 681 (1943).
8 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933). "As the amounts payable depend upon the gains
of the business, the specified percentages are not per se unreasonable. . . . [T]he
payments under the by-law have by reason of increase of profits become so large
as to warrant investigation in equity in the interest of the company."
9 "[T]he court will not interfere with the internal management of corpor-
ations, and therefore will not substitute its judgment for that of the officers and
directors." Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. 61 F. Supp. 905, 911 (E.D. Pa. 1945) ;
aff'd, 155 F.2d 522 (3d Cir. 1946). "Questions of policy of management, of ex-
pediency of contracts or action, of adequacy of consideration not grossly dis-
proportionate, of lawful appropriation of corporate funds to advance corporate in-
terests, are left solely to the honest decision of the directors .... To hold otherwise
would be to substitute the judgment and discretion of others in the place of those
determined on by the scheme of incorporation." Ellerman v. Chicago Junction Ry.,
49 N.J. Eq. 217, 232 (1891). See Merriman v. National Zinc Corp., 82 N.J. Eq. 493,
89 Atl. 764 (1914) ; CCH 1 PENSION PLAN RULINGS ff 10201 (1954) ; Carson, Current
Phases of Derivativre Actions Against Directors, 40 MICH. L REv. 1125, 1128-1131
(1942) ; See also 5 FLETCHER, PIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 2126, 2129 (perm. ed. rev.
repl. 1952).
101n Gottfried v. Gottfried, 112 N.Y.S.2d 431, 461 (1952) the court said
that there is no simple test available to determine when an incentive compensa-
tion contract keyed to employer's profits is wasteful and that the courts are loath
to overturn a contract particularly when "the only defect claimed is that as
things worked out the contingent compensation proved to be excessive."
1959]
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of the directors is unreasonable per se is a trespass by the court upon the
domain of the corporation directors.
In addition to the main objection of "unreasonableness," the court
stated that the company was aware of the fact that the market value of
the stock bore no reasonable relation to services rendered and this was
why the company provided a two year extension for determining the
value of the stock."1 The defendant stated in its supplemental brief
that the purpose of the two year provision was to give the employees a
chance to capitalize on the fruits of their labor which might not be trans-
formed into market appreciation at the time of retirement. It would
seem clear that the reflection of valuable services in the rise of the corpo-
rate stock would not be an instantaneous operation.
Since two top executives did not participate in the plan the court
reasoned that their services contributed to the increase in the value of the
capital stock, and yet others reaped the benefits from their labor. This
objection could be brought against the plan even if these two men had
joined, since through their positions and abilities they effectively con-
trolled the policy of the company. But more important, this criticism by
the court recognizes that the valuable leadership and services of these
two men did result in a rise in the market value of the stock.
The court vigorously objected to the plan because of the influence
on the stock of non-recurring capital gains derived from the sale of
assets in transactions where only one or two executives participate but in
the fruits of which all of the unit holders would share. Such a criticism
does not take into consideration the fact that one of the assumptions
underlying profit sharing plans is that the efforts of all key personnel
helped to provide the company with the asset now being sold. Since unit
holders would suffer from non-recurring losses, it seems only fair to
permit them to share in non-recurring gains.
One of the main reasons for instituting such a plan was to furnish
an incentive for the employees to remain with the company and put forth
their best efforts. The training of a top executive involves an expense
which the corporation would like to amortize over a long period. In
speaking of profit sharing plans, the court in the Gruber case said:
The company is compensated by increased profits, ultimately
distributed to the shareholders through dividends, and elicited
to a great extent by that continuity of service on the part of
its executives which would otherwise be frustrated.'2
A $51,000 bonus paid to the chairman of the board of directors of
11 The plan as originally instituted provided a five year period extending
from date of retirement during which the retired employee could select a market
value date which would serve as the basis for computing his bonus. The plan
was amended to provide for a two year period and any date chosen during this
period had to be designated ten days in advance.
12 Gruber v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., supra note 3, at 597.
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Republic Steel was held valid as incentive for his continued valuable
services.
13
A retirement plan such as that of Pitt-Consol serves as one method
of hedging against inflation. In an inflationary economy, a retirement
bonus determined by prior income gives to the employee a dollar valu-
ation which does not represent the purchasing power that it did at the
time the right to the bonus was earned. 4 Many pension plans which are
automatically adjusted to the cost of living continue to do so even after
the employee has been retired.' Since studies show that there is a corre-
lation, though not exact, between stock prices and cost of living,16 it
would seem that the Pitt-Consol plan has this valuable built-in feature.
Conceding that the benefits paid out under any compensation plan
must bear a reasonable relation to the services rendered, this does not re-
quire a finding of more than that the total compensation paid out is
related to the total benefits received. Thus it has been suggested that the
existence of this relationship should not be tested by whether the corpo-
ration will receive from any individual employee services in the future
commensurate with the pension to be paid him, but rather by whether the
overall cost of the pension plan will be offset by the total benefits arising
from the existence of the plan.' 7
The decision in this case reduces the sphere of operations in which
corporate directors can move without fear of judicial intercession. It
also tends to neutralize the effectiveness of the business judgment rule.
Since many other companies have adopted the Management Unit
Plan or a similar system for compensating their executives, the importance
of this decision is clear. Because this is a case of first impression, it sets
a trend which may be followed by other courts. The validity of these
other plans will depend upon their factual similarity to the Management
Unit Plan and whether the court will withhold its judgment until it can
be ascertained whether or not the amounts actually paid out were
excessive.
Rick E. Marsh
13 Holmes v. Republic Steel Corp., 84 Ohio App. 442, 84 N.E.2d 508 (1948).
14 Calvert, Taking the Gamble Out of Pensions, 51 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 415
(1953) ; 1 P-H CoRP. SERV. ff 25048 (1957).
15 1 P-H CORP. SERV., supra note 14. E.g., an employee accrues a pension
unit of $100 in 1956 and the cost of living in that year is 116. If at retirement,
the cost-of-living index stands at 140, that particular pension would be adjusted
by multiplying 140 x 100. The result is an adjusted pension unit of $121. Many
116
plans continue this adjustment even though the employee has been retired for
many years.1
o Ibid.
3
7 Note, 70 HARv. L. Rv. 490 (1957).
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